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Law-economics Analysis for the Restriction of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
ANALYSE DE LA RESTRICTION DU DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ 
INTELLECTUELLE SUR LA MÉTHODE DE DROIT-ÉCONOMIE 
Ning Lizhi1 
 
Abstract: The restriction of Intellectual property rights, as an important principle and system in the 
Intellectual property law, has its own existence of the reasonable economic basis. This thesis begins 
with the definition of intellectual asset rights, reveals that the intellectual asset has the double 
properties of private products and public products, and demonstrates the rationality of moderate 
private right protection. And then it revises the economic senses in the intellectual property system 
using the method of economic analysis, and analyzes the important role which intrinsic balance 
mechanism and exterior restriction mechanism play, to guarantee information resource configured 
liquidly and carried on effectively. 
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Résumé: En tant que le principe et l’institution importants du droit de propriété intellectuelle, la 
restriction du droit de propriété intellectuelle existe sur la base rationnelle de la science économique. 
Je commence dans cette thèse par la délimitation du droit de propriété intellectuelle afin de 
découvrir sa double caractéristique: produit privé et produit public, et d’argumenter la rationalité de 
le protéger mesurément comme le droit privé. Et ensuite, j’étudie la raison économique de 
l’institution du droit de propriété intellectuelle, au moyen d’analyse économique, et j’explique 
l’importance de son mécanisme équilibré à l’intérieur et son mécanisme restreint à l’extérieur pour 
assurer la distribution facile et la fonction effective des resources informatiques. 
Mots-Clés: droit-économie, restriction du droit de propriété intellectuelle, critère de PARETO 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There are many important economic meanings behind 
law, no matter whether the legislators realize the 
meaning consciously or not, law-economics or so called 
economic analysis law came about and owned more and 
more people’s attentions after experiencing certain 
developing periods. As for what the law-economics is, 
so far there does not only exist a definition that is widely 
accepted by the public, but also by very famous scholars 
such as Richard‧A‧Posner, Robert‧Kart and Thomas‧ 
Youln who have not given a definition to the 
law-economics. 2  Although law-economics has both 
extensive meaning and profound content, the substance 
of law-economics still emphasizes the society’s interest 
and benefit related to legal system, which researches 
and studies for this subject are conducted from the 
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economic position. It advocates that law should 
minimize the social cost in the rights’ definition. That is, 
it requires law should choose a kind of right 
configuration and implementation procedure which 
have a lower cost. It provides us a way to know and 
evaluate the intellectual property rights system 
according to the principle of efficiency. The author uses 
the method of economic analysis to revise whether the 
intellectual property system contains the reasonable 
economic senses and to analyze the important role 
which intrinsic balance mechanism and exterior limit 
mechanism plays for guarantying information resource 
configured liquidly and carried on effectively. 
 
2.  PROPERTY RIGHT DEFINITION OF 
KNOWLEDGE ASSETS 
 
The definition of “The Intellectual Property Rights” was 
brought in from aboard when China joined in the World 
Property Right Organization at the end of 70’s in 19th 
century. Intellectual Property has two meanings at least. 
One is knowledge product or knowledge asset, the 
essential factor of product or the valuable goods which 
is so called knowledge property. The other is intellectual 
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property rights itself. Property is defined based on 
knowledge produce, a kind of intangible asset, and 
derived from the economist’s classification of public 
product and personal product, thus it is necessary to 
begin with this classification.  
 
2.1  Personal Product and Public Product 
The economists classify personal product and public 
product is based on whether the expense or the use of 
product that has exclusiveness. Personal product has the 
characteristic of personal exclusiveness; thus goods can 
only be used or expensed by a specific body in the 
specific space and time. On the contrary, the use or the 
expense of the public product does not have 
competitiveness. The noncompetitive refers to not only 
public product expensed by one person that does not 
reduce or reject public product expensed by the others, 
but also the public product’s natural attribute or the 
technical attribute which means that it must pay the fat 
price to use it exclusively, for instance providing 
military security in the Nuclear Age. “Proving a citizen 
the protection to against a nuclear attack does not reduce 
the amount of protection to the others ”. “It is absolutely 
impossible to provide different amount of protection to 
against the nuclear arms for different citizens.”3 
The above-mentioned productized theory provides 
an assistance to establish a comparison to the efficiency 
of private or public recourses. What circumstances is 
private actually more effective than public or vice versa? 
The general conclusion of property rights economics is 
to define personal product as private, it is favorable for 
reducing trade cost; but it is very hard to define the 
property rights of public resource or asset as private. 
The reason is that it is very difficult or impossible to 
prevent “pick-up” to destroy the operation of these 
products markets for the pure public product. What we 
called “pick-up” refers to the action that a person pays 
for cost and the others enjoy the effects freely. There are 
many “pick-up” phenomena in the use or expense of 
public product. For example, an inventor invented tools 
that can forecast weather accurately, and sold the 
weather forecast which cost dearly to people. However, 
he or she was unable to negotiate with the users to get 
the profit higher than cost, because low-cost of weather 
forecast (radio or telephone) resulted in many people 
may get the weather information freely. It was 
impossible to realize how to prevent freeloaders 
because of tremendous costs. In short, the 
users’ ”pick-up” and the high cost of supervision 
determine that the public product is not suitable for 
private manufacture like weather report.4 
                                                        
3   [U.S.] Robert D. Court, Thomas·S·Ulan. Law and 
Economics (3rd ed.) [M]. (Shishaohua & Jiangjianqiang Trans. 
Zhangjun Comp.) Shanghai: Shanghai University of Finance 
and Economics Press, 2002, p. 92 
4 Liumaoling. Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Law 
[M] Beijing: Legal Press, 1996, p 65 
So, how to define property right of knowledge assets 
is efficient? It requires to research the attributes and 
characteristics of knowledge assets. 
 
2.2  The Duality of Knowledge Asset 
Knowledge asset mainly refers to the result of people’s 
mental work, which is creativity or identity knowledge 
or information, incorporating invention, integrated 
circuits, new plant, the expression of literary, art and 
scientific works, technological secrets, industrial 
designs, software, trademark, trade name, geographical 
indications, domain names, image, etc. They are the 
assets with the duality of private product and public 
product. 
On one hand, knowledge asset has certain public 
feature. Any knowledge and any piece of information in 
use do not have exclusiveness. A technical invention 
can be put into practice by many manufactures; a 
movement can be played at the same time in different 
places. Moreover, the value of the technology and the 
movement would not reduce or lose because of 
practicing and playing many times. That is the public 
feature in economics, as though many people share the 
light and the light guide them at the same time. The 
public feature of intangible asset brings about more 
tremendous external economic effects than the public 
feature of tangible asset. For example, in China, the 
“Exculpation on the Chinese Character Fonts 
Generator” skill invented by Wang Yongming free s 
foreigners’ prejudice that input and typesetting of the 
Chinese character can not go into computer directly, and 
initiates profound changes in the typing and printing 
industry, it could even be said “created by one person, 
benefited for millions of persons ”. 
On the other hand, knowledge asset has certain 
exclusive used characteristics. Although “knowledge”, 
unlike natural recourses, has non-scarcity 
characteristics, “knowledge asset” is scarcity resources 
like land and capital. In other words, the unlimitedness 
of knowledge does not mean the unlimitedness of 
knowledge supply. It is necessary to keep secret 
(exclusive in use) to contest the numbered knowledge 
asset in a limited period. Because the creativity of 
knowledge asset may bring economic value, and an 
increase in the number of users and enterprises are 
actually dividing up innovative profit. Meanwhile, 
security of intangible asset makes the realization of 
exclusive in use become possible. As for public product 
like street lamp, it is impossible to control it to serve 
only one person by private because of overflow of light, 
therefore it does not possess security. 5 But the security 
of knowledge asset can do it, the most typical example 
is the self-protection of technology secrets and 
commercial secrets. We have heard the story that 
American Coca Cola Company “locks” their secret for a 
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long time; under the guns by notary, the valuable 
information of xinhualou moon cake formula and 
technological mystery which coheres several 
generations’ work was deposited into strongbox in 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank of China on 10am 
July 29th 1997, the valuable information with a history 
of 70 years became the first commercial information in 
China which can only be opened by the joint group that 
were the enterprise, the bank and notary. 
Of course, the exclusiveness of knowledge asset is 
not absolute, but relative. First of all, once in the 
confidential condition, much knowledge asset has not 
recognized or existed. For instance, there would be no 
sense to keep secret for trademark because its 
commercial value would not exist if the work is not 
published. Secondly, knowledge asset ephemerus asset; 
products go out of control easily for producer. In 
practice, in order to get profit from investment, we 
should concretize the intangible knowledge asset such 
as patent skills that are used in product manufacture, or 
the new plants that are used in practical agriculture 
production. However, if these products enter the market, 
insider can imitate or copy them easily by the methods 
of reverse engineering, revert engineering and so on. 
The above-mentioned duality of knowledge asset 
leads people to think about human progress and national 
development which needs the number of knowledge 
asset absolute growth and serviceable range expanding 
ceaseless, but this goal is prevented by two aspects. 
Firstly, the public feature and fugitiveness of knowledge 
asset will result in serious external economic effects so 
that it has not enough power to develop and increase the 
absolute number. Secondly, its exclusiveness is not 
propitious for using and popularizing new information. 
The efficient property rights system should be able to 
overcome the negative effects of these two systems. 
 
2.3  Different View from Economists 
Economists have not made an agreement on the 
definition of knowledge asset. According to certain 
attribution of intangible assets, some advocate privately 
owned and others advocate publicly owned. There are 
three main viewpoints: 
One is useless theory, i.e., the intellectual property 
system is useless for the growing number of intangible 
assets. F· Taussig and A·Pigou are the representatives of 
this view. They believe that the production of 
knowledge asset is a spontaneous action motivated by 
personal interests and abilities that has nothing to do 
with the legal property system. It appears that we may 
give many examples to express this point, for example, 
magnum opus like The Story of the Stone, The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms, History as a Mirror 
and so on, which still came forth in the age which had 
no copyright law in China, the word-famous four 
inventions were also invented when there was no patent 
law. However, this view ignores the historical period of 
these phenomena appeared. That is, they are all in the 
period prior to the commodity economy society. There 
were indeed that a lot of works and inventions have no 
significant relationship with market, but works and 
inventions cannot come about if they were separated 
from market or they came about but the number would 
be extremely limited in the market economy and 
commercialize nowadays. 
Second is more harm than good theory. Y·Brazel and 
K·Arrow are the representatives of this view. Y·Brazel 
believes that the patent system would cause a lot of 
people vie with each other in researching repeatedly in 
order to gain patent right, but the patent right is only 
granted to the earliest applicant, and the free of 
researching repeatedly is harmful to the society. 
K·Arrow points out knowledge asset is public product, 
thus its marginal cost is zero, privatizing the knowledge 
asset would result in increasing marginal cost and than 
reducing the use and promotion of knowledge results, it 
is harmful to society. More harm than good theory is 
reasonable in some degree for the reasons that it 
emphasizes on the marginal cost of knowledge asset in 
use and tries to reduce the total social cost. The premise 
of this view is that people try their best to produce 
knowledge asset; however without incentive 
mechanism, no one would engage in creativity activity 
from which he can gain nothing by using his energy and 
money. 
Third is beneficial and harmless theory. The early 
benthanmites like J·Bentham and  J·S·Mill hold this 
view. They believe that from the human’s nature of 
“seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages”, 
patent system protects private property of knowledge 
asset, which may encourage creativity activity. Thus it 
is efficient to define knowledge asset as private. 
In fact, the discussions existing among the 
economists have proposed a paradox regarding the 
definition of intellectual property. On the one hand, it is 
very hard for information producer to make a profit in a 
non-regulated market, the producer would not be 
stimulated strongly to create new knowledge or 
information until be given the monopoly right. On 
contrast, monopolist asks high price for the product that 
will prevent the use of the product, and therefore 
consumers may be difficult to pay for using information 
adequately. Consequently, it is impossible to achieve 
resource allocation’ optimum utility. In short, the 
paradox is ”there would be not enough information 
produced without legal monopoly, but there would be 
not too much information used with legal monopoly ”.6 
The legal method used for solving this dilemma is to 
balance implementation of spirit in the definition of 
intellectual property that is to combine enabling and 
restricting. The thesis focuses on the later, viz. 
restricting.. 
                                                        
6 [U.S.]Robert·Court & Thomas Ulen.  Law and Economics 
(Zhangjun Trans.) Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 
1991, p.18 
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2.4  The Rationality of Protection to Private 
Right within Limits 
The above analysis, the author believe that in order to 
“allocating resources in the way is good to improve 
efficiency, and protecting the optimal allocation and use 
of resources by defining right and obligation ”,7 it is 
necessary to protect private right in defining the 
knowledge asset property, but it should be appropriate, 
inadequate protection and over-protection are 
unsuitable. First, private right protection is efficient to 
producers and society. With respect to producers who 
protect their benefits in the form of patent right and 
guarantee the controlment to intellectual result and the 
recovery of input cost. It is similar by adding firewood 
of profit to fire of wisdom, private benefits promote the 
production of knowledge. Regarding society, society 
has gain larger profit at lower cost (recognizing the 
knowledge asset’ exclusive right in the limited degree 
and protecting it), which promotes the inputs of 
knowledge production and then produce a lot of 
knowledge product, cost is less than the income which 
is produced by granting the exclusive rights to producer. 
We can get the same understanding analyzing from 
economic rationality and trade free: 
First, from the standpoint of economic man’ sense, 
human have inherent pursing benefit rational. 
Economist said,“economic man ”is rational, it means 
that they will seek the maximize benefit consciously, 
thus maximizing the social interests. However, 
everyone wants to be “picked-up” and does not pay for 
“fare” because of inherent quality of pursing benefit, 
therefore, there must be an institutional arrangement to 
let the “hitch-hiker” to pay enough costs, viz. Negative 
yield, which makes “hitch-hiker” think about it but not 
do it. Take the production of knowledge resources as an 
example, person A can improve the technology by what 
he or she has learned and sell it to others, he gets the 
profit at the same time others enjoy the benefits of 
technological improvements. The premise of 
“transferring” the technology is person A “owned” the 
technology, there is clear boundary of right between his 
technology and others’ in institutional economics 
meanings. If the system, which defines the right 
ownership of knowledge resources, is omission, the cost 
of using the product would be very low even zero, thus 
there will be more “hitch-hiker” than before. For  
initiators, the developed technology which spend much 
effort and money become the “public street lamp” that 
everyone can enjoy, therefore, personal returns become 
pan-mass, the cost far outweighs the benefits. As a 
rational person, person A will lose the motivation to 
create spontaneously. Consequently ， the social 
knowledge asset would not increase because 
independent innovation becomes valueless. Likewise, 
                                                        
7  Zhang Wenxian Law Philosophy Category Analysis 
(Revised Ed.) [M] Beijing :China Politics and Law University 
Press, 2001, p. 219 
scarcity of system has direct proportion with scarcity of 
knowledge assets. Just like what professor Siluo, the 
representative of neo-institutional economics, pointed 
out the reason of the slow pace of technological change 
is largely due to without a series of knowledge asset 
ownership system, thereby destroying inventors’ 
enthusiasm and detracting social interests ultimately. 
Especially, after combining commercialization of 
knowledge result, right material and spiritual interest, 
this damage and loss is more obvious. It shows that to 
define private property of knowledge asset is good for 
defining the subjects of interests, guaranteeing 
invertors’ benefits and increasing enthusiasm for 
innovation. 
Second, from the standpoint of transaction costs, 
knowledge asset private transaction costs are always 
less than its earnings. Economics have shown that 
private property rights will inevitably lead to transaction 
costs, but public goods do not have this problem. 
Because public goods do not have alienability for use in 
the sense of right, for instsnce, it is unnecessary for one 
person to apply for lighting beneficial estate of lamp. 
This is not only because non-exclusive of consuming 
public goods decides that everyone has the right to share 
public goods like street lamp, but also because the cost 
of stopping others to use street lamp is very high, which 
means it is valueless to do it. However, it is completely 
different under the situation of private property rights. 
For instance, someone wants to pay nothing for using 
the obligee’ private light without the allowance of the 
obligee, he or she will take the risk of being published 
which costs higher than normal transactions. Therefore, 
in theory, private property rights can maintain the 
operation of normal transactions. The premise of private 
property rights is that property rights would be defined 
very clearly and the definition itself is also a cost. Thus, 
if it is impossible to define property right technically or 
if defining it will cost much by doing so, public property 
will be more worthwhile than private. Experience has 
shown that, as for knowledge asset, as long as defining 
its producers and details clearly, knowledge asset can be 
specialized, so it is possible to determine the boundary 
of ownership of knowledge asset. Knowledge asset 
have the right form in the legal meaning now, that is 
intellectual property right. The owners of knowledge 
asset may know their interest boundary clearly and they 
may get relief when their interests are infracted. 
The protections for intellectual property private 
rights’ value and its existing meaning have been proved 
by historical facts. Since monopoly law in 1623 and 
Anna bill in 1710 had been made in the United 
Kingdom, more than three centuries pasted, western 
intense industrialization, highly developed technology 
and cultural market cannot be separated with the 
contribution made by the legal principle of “intellectual 
property private right”. The protection of intellectual 
property private right once being canceled was 
recovered and improved continuously after China’s 
reform and opening up. Take the patent right for 
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example, first of all, patent right was defined as a 
franchise which can used in trade and can gain benefit in 
“The Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures” enacted in 1979. 
China put the patent law into practice in April 1985 and 
made important changes to it in 1992, which made 
patent protection step forward to the international 
standards, its main parts met the standards of  
“Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights”(hereinafter TRIPs for short) requiring 
for developed country in advance; the 2000 
amendments were geared to the WTO fully. Protection 
for private right provided by Chinese patent law gives a 
powerful motivation to technological innovation; the 
number of patent applications, the number of patents 
granted, the patent projects for national newly increased 
output all increase year by year.     
Secondly, protection for private right should be in 
the limit of balancing the interests. To maintain 
public interests is essential reason for the reasonable 
existing of intellectual property law. 
The protection for private right of intellectual 
property is based on the assumption of human sense.  In 
the age of commodity economy, human reflected its 
sense limitation: people would compare the input and 
output of their economic behavior, i.e., people are 
selfish. From the viewpoint of economics, selfishness is 
to “ maximize ＂  personal interests and to
“minimize＂ personal costs. Therefore, selfishness is 
as hurtful as healthful. It is efficient for property right 
system to have no other choice than to “maximize＂ 
the interests brought about by selfishness and to 
“minimize＂the damage brought about by selfishness. 
As mentioned above, private right protection of 
intellectual property has its own advantages which are 
compensating producers＇labor consumption, arousing 
their enthusiasm to create and enriching the spiritual 
food. All these are propitious to maximize the interests 
brought by selfishness; however, if private right 
expanses maliciously, for example, obligee asks for a 
high price in transferring the product, and even the high 
price forming a monopoly prices above competitive 
prices. It has its own disadvantages which are 
preventing spiritual products from entering market, 
impeding public use and endangering the development 
of science and cultural. All these go against minimizing 
the damage brought about by selfishness. Thus, it is 
necessary to restrict private right properly so as to 
protect social interests. All in all, intellectual property 
private right can provide a superior position to producer, 
and it is not a monopoly to damage the public interests. 
Copyright, patent right and trademark right are all an 
exclusive right in a limited period. What protection the 
obligee get cannot exceed the right limitation enacted 
by law and the balanced interests goal.  
The intellectual property systems in the world have 
been embodied the principle of the unity between 
private right protection and private right restriction. 
That is, private right protection is the premise of private 
right restriction and private right restriction is 
indispensable to private right protection. This principle 
has been recognized and affirmed repeatedly in the 
international protection for intellectual property right. 
Followed by the Paris Convention and the Berne 
Convention, TRIPs agreement which came into force in 
January 1,1995 declare in the preamble : “it recognizes 
intellectual property right as private right ＂ , 
meanwhile, ＂ it recognizes that the goal of public 
interest protection emphasized in the various national 
intellectual property right protection includes 
development purpose and skill purpose”. Article 7 of 
the agreement also stipulates clearly that:＂ protecting 
intellectual property right and enforcing right should 
aim at promoting technological innovation, transferring 
technology and disseminating technology. It is 
propitious to have mutual benefit between producers 
and users in the way of social economic welfare, 
meanwhile trying to balance rights and obligations. ＂
Practice has proved that, the principle of unity between 
private right protection and private right restriction is 
more durable and stable than concrete intellectual 
property system. But how to achieve a balance between 
insufficient private right protection and excessive 
private right protection is the eternal and basic problem 
in intellectual property law. 
 
3.  LAW-ECONOMICS BASIS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT 
RESTRICTION 
 
It can be found that the evolution of the human right 
concept from natural ownership of property to the 
definition of property right. However, ownership itself 
does not mean that wealth increases it value. The 
growth of social wealth is based on rapid movement of 
property and most optimum distribution of resources. 
Therefore, corresponding with the change from 
ownership to utilization for property right system, 
modern intellectual property system should not be 
attributed to the ownership of intellectual property right 
protection. It should confirm producer in the possession 
and domination of property and promote the dynamic 
use of property (including himself-use and others use). 
This process includes economic rationality of 
intellectual property right restriction system. 
Intellectual property right restriction refers to, 
considering social interests, a reasonable and 
appropriate restriction for the content of intellectual 
property right and the exercise of the right and 
something like that with the purpose of promoting 
common progress of the society. Intellectual property 
protected powerfully by law with fundamental purposes 
of fairness and justice is private right. However, 
intellectual property right and its object have a close 
relationship with the process and development of 
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human society including technological process, cultural 
development and economic prosperity. Thus, the 
intellectual property law gives monopolistic protection 
to obligee economic benefits, and at the same time it 
sets up a variety of reasonable restraint to achieve the 
balance between obligee ＇ interests and social 
interests.8   
 
3.1  External Economy Issues in the 
Knowledge Product Exchange 
According to the microeconomics of supply and 
demand theory, the purpose of spirit product is still to 
exchange. Only through exchanging, individuals can 
obtain the best combination of a range of products to 
achieve the maximum effectiveness or interests. In 
market economy, knowledge product, which has the 
same commercial attribution with material products, 
becomes free exchange subject. The way to use 
recourses effectively is exchanging viz. market system. 
However, the operation of market system does not 
automatically lead to the optimal allocation of resources. 
British economist Pigou, the father of  welfare 
economics, believes that market system will 
malfunction when “external diseconomics＂appears. 
The so-called “external diseconomics＂refers to the 
negative effects of “ external economy 
effects＂.American economist Paul Samuelson gives 
“ external economy effects ＂ a definition as “ the 
result is made by an economic man ＇ s behavior 
affecting another welfare, and this result is not reflected 
in the monetary or market transaction＂.9  Based on  the 
result, the effects of external economic have positive 
and negative effects. Someone plays music and others 
listen to it freely; thus it is the external positive effects 
for others; others bear the damage caused by industrial 
pollution factory and pay for the damage, that is 
external negative effects or external diseconomics.  
Intellectual property may have external diseconomy 
situation. Information producers have excellent natural 
resources (creativity), and they may take advantage of 
intellectual property monopoly to get a variety of 
“positive rent＂ (monopoly profits) in condition of 
lacking intellectual and artistic products. They attempt 
to maximize their personal interests and they may 
probably ignore the social consequences of their actions 
simultaneously.  Take the demand of using and 
consuming information into consideration, users may 
utilize the public attribution of information to pursue the 
maximization of information effects. Thus it damage the 
producer ＇ interests. Both of external diseconomy 
situations will increase transaction costs, which is not 
                                                        
8  Taoxinliang & Yuanzhengfu  Intellectual Property Right 
Law [M] Beijing :Intellectual Property Press , 2005 p.222 
9  [U.S.]Paul·Samuelson & Willian Nordhaus. Economics 
(12th Ed.) [M] (Xiaochen Trans.) Beijing: China 
Development Press, 2002, p. 1193 
conducive to maximizing the value of utilizing 
information resources. How to deal with this problem? 
This is the question answered by intellectual property 
law.  
 
3.2  The Inspiration from Coase Theory 
American professor Ronald Coase in Law school of 
Chicago University analyzed the impact of legal system 
to the allocation of resources by using transaction cost 
concept, and then he pointed out the importance of right 
definition and right arrangement in economic 
transactions. Coase＇s theory is usually expressed as 
the following three rule: (1) If there is a “ zero 
transaction costs＂, no matter how to choose the rule, an 
efficient outcome will appear. In other words, when the 
exchange is free and individuals are mutual-cooperative, 
any legal right allocations are efficient. (2)If there is a
“ real transaction costs＂ , it is impossible to have 
effective results under every rule. That is to say, 
different right definitions will bring different effective 
allocation of resources. (3) There are transaction costs 
in the definition of property rights, the arrangement of 
property rights and re-arrangement. All of these may be 
hampered by the high transaction costs. Coase theory 
believes that as long as rights can be defined clearly  
exchangedfreely and the subjects can be acted 
cooperatively , the distribution of rights will have 
beneficial results no matter who has the right. However, 
the transaction cost is only an assumption, and there is 
“real transaction cost＂ in the practical transaction. 
This transaction costs include the costs of getting 
accurate market information, the costs of bargaining and 
signing contract and the cost of monitoring contract 
performance. In conditions of real transaction cost 
above-mentioned, it is impossible to have effective 
results in every rule. The reasonable rule is the legal rule 
which can reduce the effect of transaction cost and even 
minimize the effect.  
When people face external issues such as person A 
has harm person B, they should consider how to stop 
person A following what Pigou has said in “welfare 
economics＂. Here are some methods to stop it: (1) 
requesting person A pay for the losses; (2) imposing tax 
on person A according to the loss; (3) charging person A 
to stop the action. However, these methods are not 
suitable because the obstructive action has reciprocity. 
Stopping person A may prevent damage to person B, 
while it might damage person A. Proper consideration is 
to minimize what clients have suffered. As Costa 
said :＂the problem has reciprocity, viz. to avoid the 
damage to person B may be harmful to person A. the 
real issue which we must decide is to allow person A to 
damage B or to allow person B to damage person A? 
The key to this problem is to avoid more serious 
harm ＂ . 10  Similarly, in the production--- 
                                                        
10  [U.S.]Ronald · Coase  Social Cost Problem [A] The 
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transmission--- use of intellectual property rights legal 
chain, to safeguard the producers＇interests should be 
the core principle of legislation, and to forbid tortuous 
act of  disseminators and users by utilizing property 
system and liability system; however, if producers are 
allowed to monopolize all right resources to control the 
dissemination and use of information products, it will 
bring about a high trade cost. Consequently, either users 
often gain the authorization or pay for monopoly price 
to reject using information product, or they pay for 
various costs such as costs for obtaining market 
information, costs for bargaining, costs for signing 
contracts and costs for monitoring the implementation. 
Obviously, it is a system choice without efficiency 
In summary, the Coase theory tells us that different 
ways of right resources allocation will bring about 
different efficiency. Thus, people should weigh all 
parties＇gain and loss so as to maximize the total 
interest when they design and choose the system of 
protection and restriction for intellectual property right.  
 
3.3  The Rationality of Pareto Standards 
and Restrictions 
Since Law Economics regards maximum benefit as a 
starting point of choosing a particular system, it must 
judge the standard of effectiveness firstly. In 
microeconomics, the leading standards for judging the 
effectiveness itself are Kaldor standard and Pareto 
standard. Kaldor standard believes that the change 
brought about by effectiveness is advisable even if 
someone losses his interest and someone benefits from 
it. Law economics does not agree with this view, but it 
advocates Pareto standard. Pareto effect, named by 
economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto in 19th 
century, is usually expressed as “if there is no way to 
make someone better without causing others worse, this 
situation is Pareto effectiveness.” 11  Pareto standard 
considers that increasing effect must be beneficial to all 
parties, and it is not effective to improve the interest of 
one party at the cost of damaging the others.  
According to Pareto standard, only if all parties＇
interests are protected based on maximum regularly, 
intellectual property system be can efficient. For details, 
intellectual property not only should provide necessary 
conditions and motivation for creative action of 
knowledge producer, but also should provide 
encouragement and stimulation for flourish of 
intellectual property industry and development of 
international intellectual property trade. At the same 
time, it should offer market to users to choose 
knowledge product freely and supply the order of 
market to the subjects. All these meet the Pareto optimal. 
In contrast, it is an ineffective choice to damage any 
                                                                                     
Development of Property Right and System [C] Shanghai : 
Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 1994, p. 4 
11 [U.S.] H·Fanlan Micro-Economics: Modern Perspective 
[M] Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 1994, p. 24 
party, which may be producers, disseminators, users or 
competitors, to increase the other parties＇interests. In a 
word, the standard of the Pareto effect, which is an 
economics basis for the rationality of intellectual 
property right restriction system, can make right 
restriction and balanced spirit have economical 
rationality.  
 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Regarding the consideration for balancing obligee 
interest and public interest, it is widely accepted that 
intellectual property right used as private right should 
be reasonably restricted. The “ eternal problem ＂
discussed now is the border of right restriction, that is to 
design what kind of intellectual property right 
restriction system can maximize the total effectiveness. 
Economic theory provides the external support for 
constructing the restriction system:. Coase theory 
reveals different right resources allocation that would 
bring about different effects; the standard of Pareto 
effect provides intellectual property right restriction a 
limited measure--- not to increase the interests of other 
parties by harming the interest of one party.  
However, legal practice is far more complex than 
simple theory problem, it is a more arduous process to 
design restriction system in details besides discussing 
the need for intellectual property right restrictions. The 
economic rationality of balancing interests points us the 
“direction of advance＂. The selection of a solid way 
is limited by economic and technological developing 
lever, legal system, history and so on; the enrichment in 
details will establish on the base of a more detailed 
economic analysis. 
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